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ETHiCS ATTORNEY MISCONDUCT RuLES OF
DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT - The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
held that because of the "egregious" nature of the offense an
attorney may not rely on purported "mitigating evidence" to avoid
disbarment when he perpetrates a fraud on the judicial system by
using an impersonator to orchestrate the conviction of one client to
benefit another client.
PROFESSIONAL

Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Raiford, 687 A.2d 1118 (Pa.
1997).
On January 17, 1997, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania adopted
the recommendations of its Disciplinary Board ("Board") and
disbarred attorney Milton E. Raiford ("Raiford") from the practice
of law in Pennsylvania.1 Raiford's disbarment resulted from his
convictions on obstructing the administration of law or other
governmental function, 2 unsworn falsification to authorities,3 and
tampering with public records and information. 4 The events leading
to Raiford's conviction and disbarment began shortly after April 23,
1992, when Jonas Gillespie ("Gillespie") and Michelle Payne
("Payne") jointly retained him to defend them on criminal drug
charges. 5
Officers of the City of Pittsburgh Police had arrested Gillespie
and Payne three days earlier, on April 20, 1992, after finding heroin
and marijuana in Gillespie's vehicle. 6 When Payne refused to claim
1. Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Raiford, 687 A.2d 1118, 1120 (Pa. 1997).
2. Pennsylvania classifies "obstructing the administration of law or other governmental
function" as a second degree misdemeanor. This crime occurs when an individual "obstructs,
impairs, or perverts the administration of law. . . by force, violence, physical interference or
obstacle, breach of official duty, or any other unlawful act,

. . ."

18 P. CONS. STAT. ANN.

§ 5101 (1983 & West Supp. 1997).
3. Pennsylvania classifies "unsworn falsification to authorities" as a second degree
misdemeanor. A person commits this crime when he intentionally misleads "a public servant
in performing his official function [if] he .. .(2) submits or invites reliance on any writing
which he knows to be forged, altered, or otherwise lacking in authenticity,. .. " 18 Pk CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 4904(a)(2) (1983 & West Supp. 1997).
4. This offense can be graded as either a second or third degree misdemeanor and
occurs when a person "(1) knowingly makes a false entry in, or false alteration of, any
record, .

.

. kept by the government.

.. "

18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4911(a)(1) (1983 & West

Supp. 1997).
5. Report and Recommendations of the Disciplinary Board of the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania, No. 50 DB 94, at 9.
6. Id. at 4-8. Gillespie and Payne were seated in Gillespie's car when police arrived.
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ownership of the drugs, as suggested by Gillespie, Attorney Raiford
committed a series of deceptions against the Court of Common
Pleas of Allegheny County that favored Gillespie at the expense of
his other client, Payne.'
The deceptions began on May 24, 1992, when Raiford brought
Justine Wallace ("Wallace") before Sergeant Joseph Dissen, one of
the arresting officers, fraudulently representing to Sergeant Dissen
that Wallace was actually his client, Payne.8 At this meeting,
Wallace, pretending to be Payne, signed a confession stating she
was the owner of the drugs and thereby exonerated Gillespie.9 On
June 9, 1992, Wallace again impersonated Payne during a
preliminary hearing at the Pittsburgh City Magistrate Court.'0
During this hearing, Raiford participated in the deception by
waiving Payne's rights to a preliminary hearing although he was
fully aware of the true identity of Wallace/"Payne.""
To cover up these activities, Raiford falsely told the real Payne
that the police had dropped the charges against her, and that she
would not have to appear in court again.'2 Raiford appeared at both
the formal arraignment and the pre-trial conference on Payne's
13
behalf without either her participation or knowledge.
Finally, on November 6, 1992, the last two events in this string of
deceptions occurred.' 4 Wallace and Attorney Raiford met with an
assistant district attorney during the morning hours to reach a plea
agreement.' 5 Later that same day, Attorney Raiford and Wallace,
still impersonating Payne, appeared before Judge Cashman of the
Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County to enter a guilty plea
pursuant to their agreement.' 6 Attorney Raiford conducted the
guilty plea colloquy and later reviewed the written document with
Each was charged with simple possession, possession with intent to deliver heroin and
marijuana, as well as conspiracy. Id.
7. Raiford, 687 A.2d at 1119.
8. 50 DB 94, supra note 5, at
14.
9. Id.
10. Id. at
17-21.
11.
Id.
12. Id. at 23.
13. Report and Recommendation of Hearing Committee 4.01, No. 42, Disciplinary
Docket No. 3, Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, Aug. 25, 1995, at 27-30 ("Report of Hearing
Committee").
14. Id. at 30-34.
15. Id. The agreement dropped the more serious charge of "intent to deliver" in return
for guilty pleas on the lesser charge of "possession." Consecutive one-year probationary
sentences were agreed to by the parties. Id.
16. Id.
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the false "Payne." 7 Wallace then signed the document as "Michelle
Payne" under the supervision of Raiford. 8 Judge Cashman
sentenced "Payne" to one year probation on each count, to be
served consecutively. 9
Nearly a year later, on October 27, 1993, the true Michelle Payne
met with Judge Cashman to inform him of the facts and
circumstances surrounding her conviction. 20 The investigation that
followed exposed Raiford's actions and led to his indictment.21 On
April 22, 1994, Raiford entered a guilty plea on all three counts
22
contained in the indictment.
Following his conviction, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
imposed a temporary suspension of Raiford's license to practice
law under the Pennsylvania Rules of Disciplinary Enforcement
("Pa. R.D.E."), Rule 214, pending further investigation.23 The Office
of Disciplinary Counsel subsequently filed a Petition for Discipline
against Raiford on July 13, 1994.24 Raiford's disciplinary hearing
occurred on November 16, 1994.25 In its report, dated August 25,
1995, the hearing committee recommended Raiford's suspension
from the practice of law for a maximum of three years, citing
Raiford's favorable actions after his misdeeds were discovered, his
17. Id.
18. Report of Hearing Comittee, supra note 13, at 33.
19. Id. at 34.
20. Id. at
35. On November 3, 1993, Payne's post-conviction relief petition was
granted by the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County and her conviction vacated
without further action. Id. at 36.
21. Id. at
37. On April 22, 1994, a criminal information, docketed at C.C. No.
94-05057, was filed against Raiford in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County. He
was charged with "obstruction of administration of law or other governmental function"
under 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5101 ("Count 1"), "unsworn falsification to authorities" under
18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4904(A) ("Count 2"), and "tampering with public records or other
information" under 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4911 nn. 2-4 ("Count 3"). Raiford, 687 A.2d at
1119. See supra notes 2-4 and accompanying text.
22. Report of Hearing Committee, supra note 13, at 38. Under Count 1, Raiford was
sentenced to two year probation, 250 hours of community service, and payment of the costs
of prosecution. Id. Under Count 2, he was sentenced to one year probation to be served
consecutively. Id. There was no sentence imposed under Count 3. Id.
23. Id. at 3, "Conclusions of Law." PA. R.D.E., Rule 214 requires that notification of
an attorney's conviction in a criminal matter be sent to the Office of Disciplinary Counsel or
the Secretary of the Board, as appropriate, by both the clerk of any convicting court and any
attorney convicted of a serious crime. It also requires temporary suspension of the attorney
pending any further definitive action under the rules. PA. R.D.E., Rule 214.
24.
50 DB 94, supra note 5, at "History of Proceedings." The Board found Raiford's
convictions constituted an independent basis for discipline. Id. Rule 203(b)(1) provides: "(b)
The following shall also be grounds for discipline: (1) Conviction of a crime which under
Enforcement Rule 214 . . . . may result in suspension." PA. R.D.E., Rule 203(b)(1).
25. Hearing Committee Report, supra note 13.
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record of no prior offenses, his remorse, and positive character
evidence as mitigating his unethical conduct.26 At its December 7,
1995 meeting, however, the Board refused to adopt the
recommendation of the hearing committee, instead recommending
Raiford's disbarment to the supreme court, retroactive to May 27,
1994.27

It has long been established, and remains undisputed, that
conviction of a crime is an independent basis for discipline. 28 The
issue examined by the supreme court in Raiford was not whether
disciplinary action against an attorney is appropriate when the
attorney has been convicted of a criminal offence, but whether the
extreme sanction of disbarment is warranted when an attorney
attempts to mitigate his misconduct by providing evidence of
remorse for his misdeeds, cooperation after the fact, lack of prior
wrongdoing, and favorable character testimony.2 The court held
that disbarment was appropriate because Raiford's "outrageously
unethical"3 0 actions toward both the court and his client, Payne,
and the court demonstrated a "fundamental lack of integrity and
31
fitness to practice law."
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has long considered an
attorney's attempt to secure a favorable verdict through corrupt
testimony a serious offense. During the 1920's, the court disbarred
an attorney who introduced perjured civil testimony in In re
Barach.32 Adams, the plaintiff in a civil claim, engaged attorney
Barach through a mutual friend, Anderson. Barach represented
Adams in his claim for injuries suffered on a railroad line near
Atlasburg, Pennsylvania-m At trial, attorney Barach called three
26.
Id. at "Recommendation." The hearing committee recommended an additional
suspension period be added to the temporary suspension already ordered, to run "eighteen
(18) months or until May 27, 1997, whichever is earlier." Id. Raiford was originally suspended
on May 27, 1994, making the total suspension period a maximum of three years, ending not
later than May 27, 1997. Id.
27.
50 DB 94, supra note 5, at "Recommendation." The Board further recommended
all expenses of the proceeding be charged to Raiford. Id.
28.
Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Raiford, 687 A.2d 1118, 1119 (1997) (citing Office
of Disciplinary Counsel v. Costigan, 584 A.2d 296, 300 (Pa. 1990)). This statement is based
upon PA- R.D.E., Rule 203(b)(1) ("Grounds for Discipline"), which makes any crime that may
result in suspension under Rule 214 an independent ground for discipline. PA R.D.E., Rule
203(b)(1).
29. Raiford, 687 A.2d at 1119.
30.
Id. at 1120.
31.
Id.
32.
In re Barach, 123 A. 727 (Pa. 1924) (holding that disbarment will be upheld when
an attorney introduces false evidence to obtain a settlement in a civil case).
33.
Id. at 727-28.
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witnesses whose testimony resulted in a jury award of $5,000
damages to Adams.34 However, the witnesses perjured themselves
at the behest of Attorney Barach, in exchange for a share of the
attorney's portion of the damage award. 35 After Barach refused to
pay him a promised finder's fee for referring Adams, Anderson
approached the defense attorneys and offered information that
would defeat Adam's claim, in exchange for money.36 After defense
counsel agreed to the payment, Anderson informed them about the
perjured testimony. Although too late to be used in the trial, the
court granted a rehearing based upon the new evidence provided
by Anderson.3 7 The rehearing resulted in a directed verdict for the
defendants, as well as the filing of criminal charges against Barach
and the tainted witnesses.38
The Barach court examined several issues in deciding whether
the attorney should be disbarred. First, Barach claimed "res
ajudicata" [sic], arguing that his acquittal in the criminal case
prevented the court from imposing further sanctions. 39 The court
rejected this argument, ruling that because disbarment is a civil
action, "an acquittal on a [criminal] indictment will not prevent the
maintenance of a civil suit based on the same facts." 4° The court
identified the purpose of a criminal prosecution as punishment,
while a disbarment action serves the public policy goal of
protection of the public and the courts.4' The supreme court upheld
the decision of the hearing master and affirmed Barach's
disbarment. 42 The court stated, "Though the power to [order
disbarment] is always to be exercised with great caution, 43 yet
there should be no hesitation in directing disbarment where made
necessary for the protection of the court and the public." 44 The
34.

Id. at 728.

35. Id. Three witnesses presented by Barach claimed to have seen the accident,
although none was actually present. Id. The witnesses were convicted of conspiracy, but
attorney Barach was acquitted of criminal charges. The witnesses confessed to perjury and
the court found that the false testimony was suggested by Barach. Id.
36.

Id.

37.

Barach, 123 A. at 728.

38.

Id.

39.

Id. at 729.

40.
41.

Id.
Id.

42. Barach, 123 A. at 729.
43. Id. (citing In re Sherwood, 103 A. 42 (Pa. 1918)).
44. Id. (citing In re Graffius, 88 A. 429 (Pa. 1913)). The court explained that the Board
of Governance was formed on the initiative of the Pennsylvania Bar, and its purpose was to
review the recommendations of the hearing masters and to make its own independent
recommendations to the court. Id.
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court held that an acquittal on criminal charges did not bar an
independent analysis of attorney misconduct for disciplinary
purposes.4 5
In the 1930's, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania established a
Board of Governance of the Pennsylvania Bar ("Board of
Governance") to handle attorney discipline problems. 46 Ultimate
authority remained with the court itself, but the Board served to
review hearing masters' recommendations to determine if such
47
recommendations were warranted.
In Klensin v. Board of Governance of the Pa. Bar, the
respondent was accused of numerous violations of ethical conduct:
unethical
solicitation,
unethical
compensation
contracts,
subornation of perjury, and submission of false affidavits.48 Klensin
regularly used his father to personally solicit business. 49 In one
instance, the father visited three indigent and uneducated widows
with small children within days of their husbands' deaths in an
automobile-train collision near Carbondale, Pennsylvania. 50 Klensin's
father convinced each widow to sign his son's standard engagement
contract, which called for a legal fee amounting to half the amount
recovered, whether the award was by settlement or verdict. 51 In
another instance, Klensin's father persuaded the mother of an
injured child to sign a contract that called for her to pay all
litigation costs, in addition to Kleinsin's one-half share. 52
In pursuing the claims of the widows, Klensin submitted an
affidavit from Stanley Rushen ("Rushen") who claimed to be an
eyewitness to the collision.5 Rushen's affidavit contained fabricated
45.
46.

Id.
Klensin v. Board of Governance of the Pa. Bar, 168 A. 474, 475 (Pa. 1933) (per

curium).
47.
Id.
48.
Id. The court noted that the report of the Board of Governance on Klensin's
misconduct was 771 pages in length. Id.
49. Id. at 476. Fifteen witnesses testified that Kiensin's father had personally solicited
legal business for his son. Id. Klensin argued that his father was not acting as his "runner'
because he received no compensation for his activities; he was merely acting like a proud
father in telling people about his son. Id. A review of Kiensin's office records showed
substantial payments to his father, but Klensin claimed that his father was a natural object
of his bounty. Id. The court rejected both assertions. Id.
50.
Id. at 475.
51.
Kiensin, 168 A. at 475.
52.
Id. at 476.
53.
Id. Rushen was one of the complainants in this action. Id. Kiensin promised
Rushen $42 for his perjured affidavit. Id. When Klensin refused to pay, Rushen complained
to the Lackawanna County Bar Association. Id. When Klensin heard of this, he paid Rushen
the $42 in exchange for Rushen's retraction of his complaint. Id.
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testimony designed to support Klensin's case. 54 When Rushen later
expressed concern about swearing to false testimony at the
hearing, Klensin told him he would have to lie because he had
already signed a sworn statement containing the false testimony.5
The hearing master later found that Rushen gave perjured
testimony suborned by Klensin.6 Although Rushen had admitted to
perjuring himself several times, and had a history of unreliability as
a witness, the hearing master found his testimony concerning his
perjury was truthful when confronted at the hearing. Before the
hearing master, Rushen testified that he had not seen the
57
accident.
The court examined several different issues in this case,
including the relationship of the review by the Board of
Governance to the decisions of the hearing masters. Concerning
Klensin's deliberate introduction of perjured testimony to obtain a
favorable verdict, the court said, "It is inconceivable that he could
be permitted to hold himself out to the public any longer as fit and
worthy to serve them."5 The court clearly stated that it considered
the issue of perjured testimony and subornation as the most
serious charge against Klensin. 59 The court ordered Klensin
disbarred and his name stricken from the roll of attorneys.6°
The American Bar Association recognized the need for a code of
legal ethics as early as 1908 when it adopted its Canons of Legal
Ethics.61 As time progressed and the practice of law became more
54. Id. at 475.
55. Id. at 476.
56. Kiensin, 168 A. at 477.
57. Id. at 478.
58. Id. at 477.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 478.
61.
The Canons attempted to establish a uniform set of model rules because of the
disparity between ethical rules in the various states. ABA Informal Op. 1420, June 5, 1978.
The preamble to the Canons provided.
In America, where the stability of Courts and of all departments of government
rests upon the approval of the people, it is particularly essential that the system for
establishing and dispensing justice be developed to a high point of efficiency and so
maintained that the public shall have absolute confidence in the integrity and
impartiality of its administration. The future of the Republic, to a great extent,
depends upon our maintenance of Justice pure and unsullied. It cannot be so
maintained unless the conduct and the motives of the members of our profession are
such as to merit the approval of all just men.
No code or set of rules can be framed, which will particularize all the duties of the
lawyer in the varying phases of litigation or in all the relations of professional life.
The following canons of ethics are adopted by the American Bar Association as a
general guide, yet the enumeration of particular duties should not be construed as a
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complex, the ABA saw the need to modify the Canons because
they were merely aspirational and did not provide sanctions for
attorney misconduct or procedures for disciplinary actions by state
courts.62 The ABA appointed retired Justice Thomas C. Clark of the
Supreme Court of the United States to head a committee tasked
with formulating a set of model disciplinary rules and procedures.6
The "Clark Report" appeared contemporaneously with the ABA's
adoption of the Code of Professional Responsibility. ' Following
the ABA:s initiatives, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
established the current system of discipline through the adoption of
the Rules of Disciplinary Enforcement, effective in November
1972.6
These Rules created a sixteen-member statewide Disciplinary
Board to oversee attorney discipline 66 under the supreme court's
jurisdiction. 67 Pennsylvania is divided into four districts, each with
denial of the existence of others equally imperative, though not specifically
mentioned.
ABA CANON OF PROFESSIONAL ETHIcs, preamble (1908).
62. ABA Informal Op. 1420, June 5, 1978.
63. The "Clark Report" was entitled Problems and Recommendations in Disciplinary
Enforcement. ABA Special Comm. on Evaluation of Disciplinary Enforcement, Problems and
Recommendations (1970). This report was adopted by the ABA House of Delegates on
August 11, 1970. 95 ABA REP. 539 (1970).
64. The Model Code of Professional Responsibility ("Code") was ratified by the ABA
House of Delegates on August 12, 1969. PA R.P.C. 205 (1987). Individual state supreme courts
must adopt the Code before it becomes effective in a particular state. ABA Informal Op.
1420, June 5, 1978. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania adopted the Code on February 27,
1974. Miller v. Federal Kemper Ins. Co., 508 A.2d 1222, 1230 (Pa. Super. 1986). The
Pennsylvania Rules of Professional Conduct ("PA- R.P.C.") superseded the Pennsylvania
Code of Professional Responsibility and were adopted by the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania on October 16, 1987. C.P.C. v. State Ethics Comm., 698 A.2d 155, 157 n.3 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1997). The PA R.P.C. became effective on April 1, 1988. Id.
65.
C.PC., 698 A.2d at 157 n.4. The Rules of DisciplinaryEnforcement were adopted
by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania on March 21, 1972 and became effective on November
1, 1972. Id.
66. Among its other powers, the Board has the power to "review... and approve or
modify a determination by a reviewing hearing committee member that a matter should be
concluded by dismissal, private informal admonition, private reprimand or the institution of
formal charges before a hearing committee." PA R.D.E. Rule 205(8). In addition, the Board
has the duty to "review the conclusions of hearing committees and special masters with
respect to formal charges and to prepare and forward its own findings and
recommendations, together with the record of the proceeding before the hearing committee
or special master, to the Supreme Court." PA- R.D.E., Rule 205(6).
67. The Board is composed of fourteen attorneys and two non-attorneys. PA. R.D.E.,
Rule 205. In 1975, the name of the Board of Governance was changed to "The Disciplinary
Board of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania" PA RULES OF COURT ix (West 1997).
Rule 103 provides: "The Supreme Court declares that it has inherent and exclusive power
to supervise the conduct of attorneys who are its officers (which power is reasserted in
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its own hearing committees and independent Office of Disciplinary
Counsel.' The hearing committees are composed of three volunteer
Section 10(c) of Article V of the Constitution of Pennsylvania) and in furtherance thereof
promulgates these rules." PA. R.D.E., Rule 103.
Rule 201, entitled "Jurisdiction," provides:
(a) The exclusive disciplinary jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and the Board under
these rules extends to:
(1) Any attorney admitted to practice law in this Commonwealth.
(2) Any attorney of another jurisdiction specially admitted by a court of this
Commonwealth for a particular proceeding.
(3) Any formerly admitted attorney, with respect to acts prior to suspension,
disbarment or transfer to inactive status, or with respect to acts subsequent
thereto which amount to the practice of law or constitute the violation of these
rules or rules of the Board adopted pursuant hereto.
(4) Any attorney who is a justice, judge or district justice, with respect to acts
prior to taking office as a justice, judge or district justice, if the Judicial Inquiry
and Review Board declines jurisdiction with respect to such acts.
(5) Any attorney who resumes the practice of law, with respect to nonjudicial
acts while in office as a justice, judge or district justice.
(b) Nothing contained in these rules shall be construed to deny to any other court
such powers as are necessary for that court to maintain control over proceedings
conducted before it, such as the power of contempt, nor to prohibit bar associations
from censuring, suspending or expelling their members from membership in the
association.
PA. R.D.E., Rule 201.
68.
The four disciplinary districts established by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
are:
District IPhiladelphia County.
District II:
Berks, Bucks, Chester, Delaware,
Lancaster, Lehigh, Montgomery,
Northampton and Schuylkill Counties.
District I:
Adams, Bradford, Cameron, Carbon,
Centre, Clinton, Columbia, Cumberland,
Dauphin, Franklin, Fulton, Huntingdon,
Juniata, Lackawanna, Lebanon, Luzerne,
Lycoming, Mifflin, Monroe, Montour,
Northumberland, Perry, Pike, Potter,
Snyder, Sullivan, Susquehanna, Tioga,
Union, Wayne, Wyoming and York
Counties.
District IV:
Allegheny, Armstrong, Beaver, Bedford,
Butler, Blair, Cambria, Clarion,
Clearfield, Crawford, Elk, Erie, Fayette,
Forest, Greene, Indiana, Jefferson,
Lawrence, McKean, Mercer, Somerset,
Venango, Warren, Washington and
Westmoreland Counties.
PA RD.E. 202(a). The Rule further provides that a district has jurisdiction over attorneys
who maintain an office in that district and over attorneys whose conduct within that district
is the subject of the investigation, whether or not they maintain an office within the district.
Pa.R.D.E., Rule 202(b).
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attorneys from within each of the four districts.6 The attorneys and
the system are financed through an annual assessment of all
licensed practitioners within the State.70
After a preliminary investigation, the Office of Disciplinary
Counsel files a Petition for Discipline.7 ' Next, a hearing is held
before one of the committees under the judicial rules of evidence.72
The Hearing Committee then files its Report and
Recommendations, which are reviewed by the full Board, who also
issue their own Report and Recommendations.73 The supreme court
automatically reviews any recommended discipline more severe
than private censure.74
Under the new framework, deceptions perpetrated by attorneys
upon the courts continue to be considered serious infractions. In
Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Grigsby, the respondent was
found to have filed a sworn application for a driver's license that
he knew to be false, and a sworn pleading that he also knew to be
false. 75 Grigsby admitted filing the false license application, but
denied the allegation on the pleading.7 6 The allegation stemmed
from Grigsby's attempt to prevent garnishment of his checking
account by filing a Petition to Stay Writ of Execution against the
account, claiming that the funds in the account belonged to his
clients.7 A hearing committee found both charges true and
recommended a one-year suspension. The Board affirmed the
recommendation of the Hearing Committee.7 8
Based upon his history of disciplinary infractions7 9 and the
gravity of false swearing, the court overruled the Board's
recommendation and disbarred Grigsby.80 The court stated, "Truth
69.
Each district is authorized to appoint three or more hearing committees, each
composed of three attorneys to investigate reports of attorney misconduct. PA. RD.E., Rule

205(c)(3).
70. PA- RD.E., Rule 219.
71. PA. R.D.E., Rule 208(f)(6).
72. PA. R.D.E., Rule 208(f)(4).
73. Pk R.D.E., Rule 298(d).
74. PA. R.D.E., Rule 214(f)(2).
75. Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Grigsby, 425 A.2d 730, 731 (Pa 1981).
76. Id.
77. Id at 732.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 731. Grigsby was privately reprimanded for failure to act competently
because of his mishandling of a client's case in 1966-67, and in 1971 for neglecting another
client's case in 1968-69. Id. He was further reprimanded for filing false fee claims as a
court-appointed attorney in 1973, and for falsely changing a date on a tenant's negligence
claim against a landlord because he had missed the statute of limitations. Id.
80. Grigsby, 425 A.2d at 733. The court held that "false swearing is an 'egregious
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is the cornerstone of the judicial system."81 To further reinforce its
point, the court quoted Daniel Webster's comment: "Tell me a man
is dishonest, and I will answer he is no lawyer. He cannot be,
because he is careless and reckless of justice; the law is not in his
heart, it is not the standard and rule of his conduct."82
More recently, the court addressed the issue of fraud perpetrated
on a client and the judicial system in Office of Disciplinary
Counsel v. Holston.83 After unsuccessfully attempting to serve
divorce papers on his client's wife,84 Hoiston forged a judge's
signature and sent the forged Decree in Divorce to his client.85
Although Holston later attempted to amend the true complaint and
petition the court for special service by ordinary mail, the judge
(the same judge whose signature Holston had forged) confronted
him about the forged decree, which had inexplicably come into the
judge's possession. 86 Holston emphatically denied any knowledge of
the matter, but later, after consulting an attorney, retracted his
denial, admitted his wrongful conduct and exhibited remorse for
his forgery and lying to the court.87
A hearing committee, and later the Board, considered Hoiston's
age and inexperience, reputation in the community, his confession,
and apology, in recommending a six-month suspension and a
one-year suspension.8 8 The Disciplinary Counsel requested a
two-year suspensions 9 The court, however, found that Holston's
knowing forgery of a court document and subsequent lying to a
judicial officer was "prejudicial to the administration of justice, and
adversely affects his fitness to practice law."9° The court further
reiterated that the purpose of disbarment is protection of the
public, the profession, and the courts, and stated, "Whenever an
species of dishonesty' which goes to the heart of the legal profession. .. " Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. (quoting Daniel Webster, Speech to the Charleston,South CarolinaBar, May 10,

1847).
83. Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Holston, 619 A.2d 1054 (Pa. 1993).
84. Id. Holston made only one attempt to serve the Complaint in Divorce upon his
client's wife. Id.
85. Id. After approximately eight months had elapsed, Holston's client asked for a
status report, and Holston assured him that the matter was progressing. Id. In August 1988,
Holston advised his client that the Decree in Divorce had been granted. Id.
86. Id. at 1055.
87. Id.
88. Holston, 619 A.2d at 1055. Holston had been admitted to practice for approximately
eighteen months when these events transpired. Id. at 1054.
89. Id.
90. Id.
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attorney is dishonest, that purpose is served by disbarment."91 The
court found that Holston's actions demonstrated "moral turpitude"
92
and disbarred him.
Before reaching any question on the appropriate level of
discipline, the court, through its hearing committee, must first find
a violation of a rule or some wrongdoing that involves moral
turpitude. A criminal conviction has long been held to be
conclusive of wrongdoing by an attorney. In In Re Gottesfeld, an
attorney had previously been charged and convicted of conspiring
to conceal assets from a trustee in bankruptcy. 93 The crux of
Gottesfeld's appeal of his disbarment was that he was condemned
without the opportunity to defend himself or establish his freedom
from guilt, because he was in prison during the disciplinary
proceeding. 94 The court held that the doctrine of res judicata
prevented Gottesfeld from disputing the truth established through
his criminal conviction, when he did have the opportunity to
dispute the charges against him. 95
The court again examined the question of a conviction as an
independent ground for disciplinary action in Office of
Disciplinary Counsel v. Troback.96 Troback had been convicted of
the interstate transportation of stolen securities under Title 18 of
the United States Code.97 The court accepted Troback's conviction
as an independent ground for discipline, and conducted a de novo
consideration of the record to weigh the underlying facts in
determining the appropriate measure of discipline. 98 Based upon the
court's finding that the facts presented to the trial court constituted
appropriate grounds for his conviction and that Troback's conduct
was a reflection upon his fitness for the practice of law, the court
91. Id. (citing Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Grigsby, 425 A.2d 730 (Pa. 1981)).
92. Id. at 1056. The court defined "moral turpitude as "anything done knowingly
contrary to justice, honesty, principle, or good morals." Id. (citing Office of Disciplinary
Counsel v. Simon, 507 A.2d 1215 (Pa- 1986)).
93.
In re Gottesfeld, 91 A. 494 (Pa. 1914).
94.
Id.
95.
Id.
96.
383 A-2d 952 (Pa. 1978).
97.
Troback, 383 A.2d at 953. Troback claimed the bonds were found in a cabinet in
his mother-in-law's apartment after her death, but that he had no knowledge of how the
bonds got there. Id. at 954. The record of the criminal proceedings showed Troback was an
officer in the trust department of a New Jersey bank where identical bonds were reported
missing from a trust account after he terminated his employment there. Id. at 953-54. See
also 18 U.S.C. §§ 2314-15.
98. Id. at 953.
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disbarred Troback.9
On the other hand, an acquittal of criminal charges or dismissal
of pending charges is clearly an issue separate from disciplinary
proceedings. Although a conviction serves as conclusive proof of
wrongdoing, an acquittal will not bar discipline. In Stone v. Board
of Governance of the Pa. Bar, a case decided simultaneously with
Klensin, the court explored the issue of whether disbarment
proceedings should be stayed until the disposition of pending
criminal charges is completed. 1 0 Among the several claims against
Stone were an attempted fraud upon the court by suborning
perjured testimony from his client and the client's daughter, and a
completed fraud through the suborned perjury of another client.' 0
The Board of Governance and the hearing masters found the
evidence of Stone's misconduct compelling and recommended
disbarment. 02
In his appeal, Stone argued that because the charges against him
were criminal in nature, he must first be convicted of those charges
before disbarment proceedings could be instituted.' °3 The court, in
Snyder's Case, held that "In the ordinary case, an attorney's name
will not be stricken from the rolls due to an indictable offense until
it has been disposed of in the criminal court.""°4 Despite Snyder's
holding that pending criminal actions were not a complete bar to
disciplinary proceedings, the supreme court found that the Stone
case was extraordinary and, therefore, upheld the recommendation
of disbarment. 0 5
The Stone court distinguished criminal actions from the civil
action of disbarment. The court adopted the logic of the United
States Supreme Court in Ex Parte Wall. The Wall Court reasoned,
"The provisions of the Constitution which declare that no person
shall be held to answer for a capital or otherwise infamous crime,
. . . and that the trial of all crimes ... shall be by jury, have no
relation to [disbarment proceedings]."' °6 Additionally, the Stone
99. Id. at 954.
100. Stone v. Board of Governance of the Pa. Bar, 168 A. 473 (Pa- 1933).
101. Id. at 473.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 473.
Snyder's Case, 152 A. 33, 36 (Pa. 1930) (emphasis added).
104.
105.
Id. The court stated, "While [criminal charges] are not a bar to the disbarment
proceedings, yet under the prevailing and what we regard as the sound rule, usually the
latter should not be forced to a conclusion while the criminal prosecutions are pending." Id.
106. Stone, 168 A. at 473 (citing Ex parte Wall, 107 U.S. 265, 288 (1883)). The court
reiterated the idea that disbarment proceedings are not for purposes of punishment, but
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court found, in Pennsylvania, the Board of Governance served to
protect the interests of the accused by conducting a peer review of
the hearing masters' findings and, therefore, the rule requiring prior
conviction if charges are criminal in nature was no longer
107
required.
The court reasserted the independent character of a disbarment
action under the new disciplinary system in Office of the
Disciplinary Counsel v. Campbell.108 Campbell was acquitted of
criminal charges of mail fraud stemming from his actions in
representing a client under federal indictment' for possession of
thirty pounds of marijuana. 19 Despite his acquittal, evidence
showed that Campbell had engaged in a course of fraudulent
activity including making false claims that he had successfully
suppressed evidence to his client in return for cash, as well as
falsely claiming participation in a sting operation involving the sale
of drugs.110 After Campbell's acquittal, the Office of Disciplinary
Counsel commenced disciplinary proceedings against him."'
Campbell claimed four exceptions to the disciplinary rules - the
second of which claimed that such disciplinary proceedings
violated the Double Jeopardy clause of the United States
Constitution. 1 2 He argued that both proceedings were based upon
the same transactions and evidence and that a disciplinary
proceeding was quasi-criminal in nature."3 The court once again
held that an acquittal of criminal charges does not bar the
suspension of an attorney's right to practice law based upon the
same acts or conduct. 14 Although the court termed a disciplinary
proceeding as sui generis quasi-criminal, the recommendation of
instead for the purpose of protecting the courts and the public from the ministrations of
persons ethically unfit to practice law. Id. at 474.
107.
Id.
108. Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Campbell, 345 A.2d 616 (Pa. 1975). The Board of
Governance was replaced by the Office of Disciplinary Counsel in 1968 with the adoption of
the 1968 amendments to the Pennsylvania Constitution. PA. R.P.C., Rule 202.
109. Id. at 618.
110. Id. at 618-19.
111. Id. at 619. Both the hearing committee and the Board recommended Campbell's
disbarment. Id.
112. Id. Campbell also claimed: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support
disbarment, (2) the disciplinary rules under which he was charged were unconstitutionally
vague, and (3) the consolidation of six charges under one action denied him procedural due
process. Id. The court found each defense insufficient to reverse the findings of the Board
and the Hearing Committee. Id.
113. Campbell, 345 A.2d at 620.
114. Id.
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the Board was accepted and Campbell was disbarred. 1 5
When the facts of a disciplinary infraction are undisputed, either
because of a criminal conviction or an admission by an accused,
mitigating factors have been argued in an effort to reduce or avoid
discipline. In an 1896 case, In re Kennedy, an attorney attempted
to mitigate his improper acts of diverting client funds by forgery,
receiving and impermissibly failing to release monetary settlements
to clients, and failing to use funds as the clients directed by
claiming insanity." 6 The court rejected evidence purporting to
demonstrate that Campbell was unable to perceive the difference
between right and wrong, but suggested that if insanity could be
proven, the appropriate discipline was probably suspension rather
than disbarment." 7 Because Campbell could not prove that he was
insane at the time of the acts complained of, his appeal was
1 18
dismissed and his disbarment upheld.
In Office of the Disciplinary Counsel v. Keller, an attorney
claimed that his misconduct resulted from a serious mental and
emotional dysfunction caused by the dissolution of a business
relationship with his brother." 9 Keller was charged with forging the
signature of an estate beneficiary onto an estate account check
Keller had made out to himself for personal use. 120 Keller similarly
converted another client's funds received in a real estate
settlement. 121 Keller argued that, but for his extreme emotional
distress, these events would not have occurred and, therefore,
disbarment was an excessive sanction.'2 The court again held that
the primary purpose of discipline is to "protect the public from
123
unfit attorneys, and to maintain the integrity of the legal system."
Although the court expressed sympathy for Keller's family and
business problems, it found that the real question was not one of
punishment, where such considerations have true bearing, but
rather whether Keller's actions reflected a general lack of the
fitness and trustworthiness necessary in the practice of law.124
Examination of the record by the court produced ample evidence
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

Id. at 623.
In re Kennedy, 35 A. 995 (Pa. 1896).
Id.
Id.
Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Keller, 506 A.2d 872, 877 (Pa. 1986).
Id. at 874.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 875.
Keller, 506 A.2d at 875.

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 36:651

that Keller was aware of the consequences of his behavior. This
evidence included a threat against his secretary, who was aware of
his misappropriation of the estate check, and a promise to "make
trouble" for any adverse witnesses who appeared before the
Board.'2 5 The court further found that Keller's conduct exhibited a
deliberative quality devoid of any evidence of delusion. 12 6 The court
127
discounted any mitigating effect and upheld Keller's disbarment.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in Office of Disciplinary
Counsel v. Christie, found a psychological sexual disorder is a
mitigating factor in a disbarment proceeding. 128 An attorney
admitted to practice in both Delaware and Pennsylvania had been
sanctioned by the Supreme Court of Delaware as a result of his
guilty plea on thirteen misdemeanor sex offenses involving two
minors in Delaware. A majority of the Pennsylvania Board
recommended a three-year and forty-five-day suspension, although
the minority strongly advocated harsher disciplinary measures.
Consequently, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania issued an order
to show cause why Christie should not be disbarred. 129 Christie's
underlying convictions were based upon his showing two male
minors, aged twelve and fourteen, X-rated videos, sharing alcoholic
beverages with them, and masturbating in their presence. 30 The
evidence showed Christie's disorder to be an involuntary condition
known as "non-exclusive, repressed homosexual pedophilia," a
treatable condition.' 31 From his arrest through the disciplinary
proceedings and physiological treatment, Christie demonstrated
complete cooperation and satisfactorily completed all aspects of his
sentencing. 32 Christie also agreed to the presence of a chaperone
in any future dealings with minor clients.'1'
As Christie's convictions provided a sole and independent ground
for discipline, the question for the court to answer was the
appropriate measure of discipline to be imposed. The court agreed
that Christie's deviate behavior arose from an involuntary
psychiatric disorder for which he had received extensive medical
treatment, and that the presence of a chaperone would protect the
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

Id. at 876.
Id. at 877.
Id. at 879.
Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Christie, 639 A.2d 782 (Pa. 1994).
Id. at 783.
Id. at 784.
Id.
Id.
Christie,639 A-2d at 784.
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public during periods of interaction with minors a4 The court
elected not to disbar Christie, but instead imposed a five-year
suspension, 35 stating, "Psychiatric disorder is an appropriate
consideration as a mitigating factor in a disciplinary proceeding.
"136

In Raiford, the only issue before the court was the appropriate
level of discipline. Under the Pennsylvania Rules of Disciplinary
Enforcement, his convictions served as an independent basis for
sanction. 137 In an attempt to lessen the severity of discipline,
Raiford cited such mitigating factors as cooperation, favorable
character testimony, demonstrated remorse, and good conduct
following his apprehension.13 The court undertook an independent
analysis of the facts and circumstances of the case to determine
the proper sanction to impose. 39 Raiford demonstrates that the
court will not consider these factors when the attorney has
committed a serious offense, such as perjury.
The analysis the supreme court undertakes in disbarment
proceedings is guided by the principles of protecting the judicial
system and clients from practitioners who have demonstrated an
unfitness for the profession. The court considers the risk an
infraction poses to the system as a whole, including the
relationship of the behavior to the character of the attorney, and
what this relationship predicts about the future conduct of such an
attorney.
Lying to a court or a client is not tolerated under any behavioral
rules, whether they are model rules proposed by the American Bar
Association or those enforced by state supreme courts. 4° Attorney
misconduct threatens the efficient functioning of the legal system
by undermining public confidence in the system's ability to function
fairly. Raiford not only lied to his client, Payne, he repeatedly
perjured himself in his dealings with the court. If the legal system
134.
Id.
135.
Id. at 786.
136.
Id. at 785 (citing Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Braun, 553 A.2d 892, 895-96
(Pa. 1989).
137.
Raiford, 687 A.2d at 1119 (citing Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Costigan, 584
A.2d 296, 300 (Pa. 1990)); PA R.D.E., Rule 203(b)(1).
138.
Id.
139.
Id. See In re Gottesfeld, 91 A. 494 (Pa. 1914); Office of Disciplinary Counsel v.
Troback, 383 A.2d 952 (Pa. 1978); Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Costigan, 584 A.2d 296
(Pa. 1990).
140. See Grigsby, 425 A.2d 730 (Pa. 1981) (holding that a reviewing court may exceed
the severity of the disciplinary recommendations of the Board and Disciplinary Counsel).
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accepts or ignores such conduct on any level, it abdicates its duty
to protect and uphold the laws that govern society.
Further, behavior exhibited after the fact provides no assurances
that such conduct will not be repeated in the future. Remorse and
cooperation may be considered if the ultimate goal is retributive
punishment, but attorney discipline is not merely punishment.
Attorney discipline is motivated by the need to protect the integrity
of the system. Therefore, factors that tend to eliminate the
possibility of such conduct occurring in the future are appropriate
considerations for the court. Raiford's cooperation during the
disciplinary proceedings was properly viewed by the court as
independent of his prior misdeeds or infractions - it cannot be
assumed that such misconduct would not occur again. The factors
Raiford asked the court to consider did not assure his future good
conduct. His misconduct presented such a severe threat to the
system, it would have been inappropriate for the court to accept
any mitigation.
This decision probably does not mean these factors will never be
considered. The significance of Raiford is that the court will not
consider these factors if an attorney's misdeeds are severe. The
court may still consider these kinds of factors to mitigate less
severe conduct and justify imposing a lesser sanction.
Another unanswered question is to what extent the court will
overrule a recommendation of disbarment when an attorney
demonstrates that the misconduct results from a treatable mental
illness. In Christie, the court imposed a five-year suspension
instead of disbarment because it accepted that such an illness is a
"mitigating factor in a disciplinary proceeding." However, the
conduct sanctioned in Christie, deviant sexual behavior, did not
threaten the judicial system in the same manner as the misconduct
in Raiford. Deviant sexual behavior reflects badly upon the
character of an individual, but is not a direct threat to the integrity
of the judicial system. Conversely, perjury and manipulation of an
outcome through fraudulent testimony not only reflects poorly
upon the individual, it is a direct threat to the integrity of the
system. Therefore, the system cannot tolerate the possibility of the
misconduct recurring. The court may not be willing to reduce its
sanction when such serious conduct occurs, although it has
accepted treatable mental illness as a mitigating factor.
The purpose of disciplinary rules is protection of the system and
the public. The ultimate focus in a disciplinary proceeding is the
probability of the offensive conduct's recurrence. It would be much
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more likely that mitigation would occur if the evidence showed the
illness to have a high probability of being cured. Thus, the
likelihood of repetition of the offensive behavior would be small
and the need to protect the system from such an individual
decreased. The court would then have the option of accepting
mitigating evidence in determining the proper level of disciplinary
sanction.
Gerald J. Kross

